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THE COURT: First of all, I want to commend counsel for their
thorough and able arguments both in their briefs and in open court.
In ruling on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in this case, I will
address in turn each of the separate issues raised. Of course, for
posterity, I must remind all present that this is a teaching vehicle and
my ruling has no binding or precedential effect in any District of
California or the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit.
As an initial matter, I have chosen to adjudicate these jurisdic-
tional issues by examining whether Closed Corporation has shown a
likelihood of the existence of each fact necessary to support jurisdic-
tion, as I may do under Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox
Canada, 46 F.3d 138, 146 (1st Cir. 1995). We have had the benefit
of a fully developed evidentiary hearing, which makes this approach
appropriate. This standard navigates a path between unfairness to
the plaintiff by requiring that it establish jurisdiction by a preponder-
ance of the evidence before discovery, and unfairness to the defen-
dants by forcing them through litigation on only a prima facie
showing of jurisdiction. See id. at 150-51.
This is a patent infringement case, and we are at a very early
stage. We have before us a motion to dismiss based on jurisdictional
grounds only; there is no pending motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion.
I.
The threshold question in this lawsuit is whether Open Sesame
Users' Group is an entity that is capable of being sued. Of course, if
it is not, the claim against the Group cannot proceed and must be
dismissed. On these facts, this question is one of first impression.
Because I am persuaded by Plaintiffs argument that Open Ses-
ame Users' Group has a "distinct purpose" and "performs specific
functions toward that end," I find that it is an unincorporated asso-
ciation and, as such, is subject to suit. Open Sesame Users' Group is
an organization much like the group at issue in Project Basic Tenants
Union v. Rhode Island Housing & Mortgage Finance Corp., 636 F.
Supp. 1453 (D.R.I. 1986), in that it has a definite purpose and has
engaged in concerted activities. In that case, the court found that,
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even though the group lacked elected officers, a budget, and bylaws,
it was far from an amorphous or transitory group. Indeed, though it
had "apparently no set group of members," the group was still held
to be an unincorporated association. Id. at 1457-58.
The group in Tenants Union did have an office, see id. at 1457,
and I find that so too does Open Sesame: Its Usenet site is the func-
tional equivalent of an office. Furthermore, the process of creating
the newsgroup in the first place evinced the organized effort behind
Open Sesame Users' Group. I was persuaded by Dr. Felten's testi-
mony about the "charter" of this newsgroup to that extent. More im-
portantly, the very nature of the collaborative project to develop the
Open operating system--regardless of whether the collaborators
voted on the charter itself-required that there be an organizational
structure to the group, with a core set of individuals controlling the
evolution of the code. Although it is a close question, I am satisfied,
given our decisions, that meaningful relief could be enforced against
the group if Plaintiff prevails on the merits.
For these reasons, I conclude that Open Sesame Users' Group is
subject to suit.
II.
Turning next to the issue of personal jurisdiction, I must ac-
knowledge that traditional notions of this venerable legal concept
must be set aside when venturing into the ether of cyberspace. The
central notion of the law of jurisdiction is that there is one geo-
graphical location in which it is appropriate for a court to hear the
case before it. The Internet, however, defies such territorial bounda-
ries and cannot be easily captured by our tangible legal system.
Nevertheless, the federal courts have begun to grapple with this issue
and provide guidance for us now. The parties here are bound by the
law of the Federal Circuit rather than that of the Ninth Circuit in this
patent infringement case. See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sover-
eign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Federal
Circuit, however, has not yet considered to what extent a court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant based solely on the
defendant's Internet contacts with the forum. Several other courts,
however, have ruled on this issue. I turn to them for guidance.
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Courts apply a "sliding scale" to determine whether the defen-
dant's Internet contacts with the forum satisfy the "purposeful avail-
ment" prong of the minimum contacts test laid out in Panavision In-
ternational, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998).
As a general rule, "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Inter-
net." Cybersell, Inc. v. Cysbersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir.
1997) (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
Cases discussing personal jurisdiction based on Web activity
generally fall into three categories. At one end of the scale are cases
where the defendant has merely posted information or advertise-
ments that are accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. In these
cases, involving so-called "passive" Web sites, courts typically hold
that the defendant has not purposefully availed himself of a forum
state in which the plaintiff had merely downloaded or viewed the
material. The Ninth Circuit decision in Cybersell is illustrative. See
Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414; Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.
Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
At the opposite end of the scale are situations in which the defendant
"enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that in-
volve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over
the Internet." Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1125-26. In such
situations, the defendant clearly does business in the forum and is
subject to jurisdiction there. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patter-
son, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 (6th Cir. 1996).
Between these extremes are cases in which the defendant cre-
ated interactive Web sites, allowing the user to exchange information
with the host computer. These cases are examined for the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information
that occurs over the Web site. See generally Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F.
Supp. at 1124 (citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergod, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)). I conclude that the case before me falls into
this middle realm of cases that require individual examination.
Plaintiff Closed Corporation convincingly argues that the pres-
ent case is governed by Panavision, see 141 F.3d at 1327, and I find
that, like the defendants in that case, Defendant Open Sesame Users'
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Group and its members are subject to personal jurisdiction. Like
trademark infingement, patent infringement is akin to a tort. See
Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 84 F.3d 1408, 1411
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (describing patent infringement as a "commercial
tort"). Further, the brunt of the harm to Plaintiff will be felt in Cali-
fornia. Like Panavision, Plaintiff is headquartered in California, and
California is the center of the computer industry; many of the soft-
ware developers and computer hardware manufacturers with whom
Plaintiff enters into licensing agreements are located in California.
The availability of Defendants' allegedly infringing operating system
is likely to harm Plaintiff's relationship with these California-based
computer companies. Given the prominence of Plaintiff within the
computer industry, Defendants must have known that Closed Corpo-
ration would suffer the brunt of its injury in California.
A closer question is whether Defendants' conduct was "ex-
pressly aimed at the forum state," the second requirement under the
"effects test." Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1316. This prong was satis-
fied in Panavision by the defendant's purposeful scheme to extort
money from Panavision. See id. at 1322. Here, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants engaged in willful infringement of Closed's patent for
Views operating system. Further, according to the stipulated facts, a
number of Open operating system users organized a protest at
Closed's California headquarters, where they returned their un-
opened Views operating system software. It is not clear whether
members of Open Sesame Users' Group participated in this protest.
If established at trial, these facts would support finding jurisdiction
under the effects test. Furthermore, both Dr. Torvalds and Dr. Felten
testified that the Open operating system was developed as an alter-
native system to Views.
Under International Shoe, however, jurisdiction must still com-
port with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1941)). Although
some defendants may be citizens and residents of foreign countries,
their discomfort in defending themselves in California is outweighed
by their actual contacts and combined interests of the Plaintiff, Cali-
fornia, and the broader judicial system.
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III.
Venue in this patent infringement case is governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400 (1993). I consider first whether this is the proper venue as to
Open Sesame Users' Group. The presence of a corporate defendant
triggers 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Under § 1391(c), an action against a
corporate defendant may be brought in any judicial district in which
the corporation would be subject to personal jurisdiction. The same
rule applies for unincorporated associations. See Denver & Rio
Grande W. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 562
(1967).
In light of the preceding analysis, venue in the Western District
is proper given that Open Sesame is subject to jurisdiction in Cali-
fornia under the "effects test" of Panavision. See Panavision, 141
F.3d at 1321.
I next consider whether this is the proper venue as to Defendants
Does 1-1000. For the individual defendants, venue is governed by
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), which provides that "[a]ny civil action for pat-
ent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the de-
fendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of in-
fringement and has a regular and established place of business." 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1993) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has
held that § 1400(b) "is specific and unambiguous; it is not one of
those vague principles which, in the interest of some overriding pol-
icy, is to be given a 'liberal' construction." Schnell v. Peter Eclkrich
& Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 264 (1961) (quoting Olberding v. Illinois
Cent. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340 (1953)).
Plaintiff does not contend that all the Doe Defendants reside in
the Western District of California. In light of the foregoing discus-
sion of jurisdiction, the non-resident Defendants do not have a
"regular and established place of business" in this District as a result
of their Internet contacts with California. Only the most liberal con-
struction of the statutory language could produce a contrary result.
Closed's appeal to "overriding policy" is unavailing in the face of the
clear statutory language. Should Closed Corporation choose to pur-
sue its infringement suit against the individual members of Open
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Sesame Users' Group, it will in all probability have to proceed with
separate suits in the districts in which each member resides.
IV.
The final issue before me today is whether Plaintiff effected
adequate service of process on Defendants. My evaluation of the
adequacy of service involves the two-step inquiry required by Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
First, the method of service must be authorized by a particular court
rule or statute, see id. at 309, and second, the method must meet the
constitutional test of "notice reasonably calculated, under all the cir-
cumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the ac-
tion and afford them an opportunity to present their objection," id. at
314. I note that courts are recognizing newer communications tech-
nologies as valid media for providing legal notice in certain contexts.
First of all, as to service on Defendant Scape Goat, counsel for
both sides concede that there is no issue pending before me since she
was personally served in this District, and therefore the Motion to
Dismiss must be denied as to her.
As to Defendants Does 1-1000, whom I have already found
cannot be served in the Western District of California, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1), service upon an individual may be
effected pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is
located.
Although California Code of Civil Procedure section 413.30
gives me discretion to authorize an alternative method where service
cannot be effected in any other way, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
413.30 (West 1973), the weight of authority compels me to agree
with Defendant Open Sesame Users' Group's argument that elec-
tronic mail is too unreliable to fall within this provision. See, e.g.,
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal.
1999). The fact is, a number of the addresses that Plaintiff procured
from the Open Sesame Usenet archive are simply no longer active. I
therefore find that, even if venue were proper, service on the Doe
Defendants was inadequate.
I am persuaded by Defendants' argument that staying a ruling
pending further discovery is inappropriate where, as here, further
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steps to obtain identities and to perform actual service should have
been accomplished prior to filing.
V.
Finally, as to service on Open Sesame Users' Group, Closed
Corporation contends that service by posting a message to the Usenet
newsgroup and OpenSource Web site is proper given the nature of
the entity.
I agree. The leaders of the Open Sesame Users' Group could
well be expected to receive actual notice of this suit as a result of
these postings by Closed Corporation. Furthermore, the applicable
statutes governing service allow for a measure of flexibility in com-
plying with the state rules for service. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
413.30. I am not persuaded that the frequency of hoaxes and so-
called "noise" is a bar.
VI.
In conclusion, I will GRANT the Defendants' Motion to Dis-
miss with respect to the Doe Defendants, subject to a request for
leave to amend. I will DENY the Motion to Dismiss with respect to
Open Sesame Users' Group and Scape Goat. If either counsel
wishes to pursue an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit (who
knows how they would rule?), I will be happy to certify under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) on request.
This session is ADJOURNED.
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